rbzpr: The  « Girondins » : Moderates? In modern historiography, the Girondins are

rbzpr: The  « Girondins » : Moderates? In modern historiography, the Girondins are often referred to as “the last moderates of the Revolution” or in similar terms, whereas the Montagnards are regarded as authoritarian radicals ; in general, the juxtaposition of the “moderate” Gironde and the “radical” Montagne seems to have become a commonplace in the historiography of the French Revolution, although recent works have put this view into question. The purpose of this article is to examine the terminology of “moderate” & “radical”, and to determine whether it is appropriate to describe the policies of the Girondins as “moderate”. Before going into detail, it is of course necessary to clarify the terminology. First of all, when speaking of “the Gironde” or “the Girondins”, it has to be stressed that these terms and the meanings attached to them are historiographical constructions: the Girondins at no point constituted a party in the modern sense (hence the quotation marks in the title) ; rather, they were a loosely defined group that was centred around a few “key players”. The term “Girondins” itself has been popularised by the romanticists of the 19th century, whereas its use during the Revolution itself was quite marginal (rather, the contemporaries of the Revolution used words such as “Brissotins”, “Rolandins” or “Buzotins”). Nowadays, it is used as a kind of umbrella term to define a loosely connected group of around 150 persons, centred around political leaders such as Brissot, Monsieur and Madame Roland, Buzot, Pétion etc. ; although some of them had personal connections, they by no means acted as a political party or had a universally shared programme. [1] Secondly, it is necessary to define the meaning of the terms “moderate” and “radical” in this context ; from the days of the Revolution to our days, these terms, too, have been subject to a fundamental semantic shift. Today, “radical” is used as a pejorative term to describe movements or attitudes that are considered to be exaggerated or excessively violent, whereas the term “moderate” evokes positive connotations of peacefulness, reasonability and temperateness (this perception, in turn, is based on a massive cultural bias, as I will elaborate later). During the Revolution, however, the situation was quite different: while the term “radical” was not very common in political discourse, the term “moderate” was widely used and was, at certain times, perceived negatively and even employed as an accusation (e.g. against Augustin Robespierre in the summer of 1794). [2] For the sake of simplicity within this article, I will define “moderateness” centred around three basic criteria: aversion to violence, opposition to centralisation of power and commitment to democracy.  On this basis, I will examine whether it is accurate to use the term “moderate” to describe the policies of the Gironde ; the analysis will be focused on three specific aspects: violence, power and democracy. violence Historiography often presents the Girondins as staunchly opposed to any kind of political violence, in contrast to the “terrorist” Montagnards ; yet, as soon as one examines the positions of prominent Girondins closer, this position becomes contradictory. The most obvious example is the Girondist position on War, which is the ultimate exertion of violence. Already in late 1791 and early 1792, prominent Girondins were advocating a full-scale war against the rest of Europe, a “crusade of liberty” (cf. Brissot’s speech of 31 December 1791 at the Jacobins). Later, prominent Montagnards would join their cause (whereas few, such as Robespierre, remained opposed to the war), and while the Girondins were not the only forces calling for a war (the party of the Court, for instance, did so, too, albeit for very different reasons), the war had always been (and was always perceived as) the project of the Gironde. Correspondingly, once the war had had begun, military defeats played a great role in the decline of the Gironde’s popularity among the people. [3] The case of the September Massacres (2-7 September 1792) is also interesting in this context. In classical historiography, the Girondins are regarded as moderates who, from the beginning, opposed the Massacres, while the Montagnards are viewed as the driving force behind the killings ; this view is largely based on later claims of prominent Girondins well after the events of 2-7 September 1792. Yet, if one considers the attitudes displayed by prominent Girondins during the September Massacres, this view soon becomes contradictory. I recently published a post focusing on the public writings and journals of prominent Girondins that were published between 2 and 7 September 1792 or in the immediate aftermath of the events, which can be found here. Some Girondins, such as Gorsas, Carra or Concordet, justified or actively encouraged the massacres ; others (e.g. Louvet, Brissot) mostly remained silent during the Massacres and would only come to criticise them later when accusing the Montagnards. The case of Roland is particularly interesting, as it is often misrepresented in historiography: his famous letter of 3 September was not a denunciation of the massacres, but of Marat and the Paris Commune. Roland in fact admitted the necessity of the massacres in said letter, while proposing to laisser un voile on the events (interestingly, he was reproached for this by Gorsas in his issue of 5 September). [4] Additionally, one has to consider that many prominent Girondins held public offices at the time of the Massacres, so the role & responsibility of prominent Girondins as ministers and public officials during the events is significant (according to Charlotte Robespierre’s mémoirs, her brother Maximilien even reproached Pétion, who was mayor at that time, for his inaction during the Massacres). [5] If one considers all of this, it becomes clear that many Girondins either tacitly accepted or openly justified the Massacres when they took place. It was only later, in their campaign against the Montagnards, that many of them, such as Louvet, would distance themselves from the Massacres and attempt to blame the Montagnards for the bloodshed. [6] Another significant example is the role of violence in language ; while prominent Montagnards such as Marat (although the classification of Marat as a Montagnard is quite controversial, per se) or Saint-Just are often criticised for what is perceived to be an excessive use of violent rhetoric, such language is by no means exclusive to the Montagne. There are numerous examples (e.g. Guadet’s speech of 12 May 1793: “All the departments will send into oblivion this handful of traitors and anarchists, who are far more to be feared than the emigrant armies or the rebels of the Vendée.” [7] ), but the most obvious one is Isnard’s famous threat against Paris, which is the culmination of his continued diatribes against the capital. In his speech of 25 May 1793, he proclaimed that if an attack were made on any of the deputies, “Paris will be annihilated. Soon, men will walk the banks of the Seine and wonder if the city ever existed.” [8] When examining the revolutionary press of 1792-1793, one will soon find that violent rhetoric was as frequent among Girondins as it was among Montagnards. If one considers all of these facts, it becomes evident that the depiction of the Gironde as moderate and strongly averse to violence is not tenable. Instead of opposing violence, the Girondins made use of it themselves when it served their purposes. Therefore, the first criterion of “moderateness” as defined above, aversion to violence, does not apply to the Girondins. power When speaking of power & centralisation, one often encounters the juxtaposition of the “federalist Girondins” and the “centralist Montagnards”. Especially in recent works, this view has increasingly been called into question, and it has become clear that the classical depiction of “Girondin federalism” does not stand up to scrutiny. As a specific analysis of this would exceed the scope of this article (and may be subject to examination in a future writing), I want to content myself with recommending Marcel Dorigny’s work on this, which you can find here. What is essential is that the Girondins were by no means opposed to a centralised power, but merely to any kind of power that was not controlled by themselves ; they did not intend to establish a federal state or to “federalise” France, but to give another centre to it (hence the continued proposals for an assembly of deputies in Bourges). Buzot constitutes the exception to this, as he was the only one among the Girondin leaders who outlined a truly federal state ; yet he himself regretfully admits that this was by no means the motivation of his allies who opposed Paris. [9] This also becomes clear when considering the role of the Gironde in the early legislative processes of centralisation. The Commission of Twelve, for example, was a project that was exclusive to the Gironde, and during its brief existence, it was solely dominated by Girondins. Having been created on 18 May under the pretext of an alleged conspiracy to destroy the Convention, the Commission targeted prominent “radicals” and members of the Commune, such as Hébert ; it was abolished on 27 May, just to be re-established on the following day. The Commission was ultimately suppressed in the course of the insurrection on 31 May 1793. [10] Apart from that, many prominent Girondins were also involved in the creation of the first Committee of Public Safety and the Revolutionary Tribunal. [11] It is also quite telling that the Girondins, while some of them originally had opposed the creation of a Revolutionary Tribunal, where among the first to make use of it and of the abolition of parliamentary immunity when indicting Marat and sending him before said Tribunal. [12] In brief, one can conclude that the Gironde did not seek to split up power, but to overthrow the one of the Montagne and to assume control themselves. They were by no means opposed to centralising measures (as long as these were under their own control) and even supported them when it furthered their cause. Thus, the second criterion of “moderateness”, opposition to centralisation of power, also fails. democracy Finally, let us examine the Gironde’s position on democracy. While the Montagnards are often regarded as “populists” or “demagogues”, the Girondins are seen as the advocates of “true democracy” (as such, they were idealised by the romanticists and liberals of the 19th century), having come to represent the concept of “moderate republicanism”. Yet, this narrative does not hold up to scrutiny, as the Girondin attitude on the demos was often characterised by elitism and scorn for the lower classes. Many Girondins, coming from a bourgeois background and being “men / women of order”, valued culture & labour and severely judged individuals who did not earn their living ; wanderers and bohemians, perceived as “idlers”, did not fit into their vision of an active and ordered society. [13] As this image of social hierarchy was very common among the Girondins, they preferred to ally themselves with the bourgeoisie of the province, viewing protests and riots as “complots” against social order (which does not mean, however, that the Girondins categorically opposed violent insurrections, as examined above ; when these riots served their purposes and/or were controlled by themselves, the Girondins were not hesitant to embrace them). The Girondins’ emphasis on social order is demonstrated, for instance, by the extent of the ceremonies that were held in memory of Simoneau in the spring of 1792. [14] Thus, one can often find a certain underlying current of elitism in Girondin writings, as many prominent Montagnards already perceived during the Revolution. Furthermore, one has to consider the Gironde’s policy of economic liberalism in this context ; the Girondin social policy, as Mathiez puts it, comes down to “absolute freedom of trade, and to the use of bayonets in order to enforce this freedom”. [15] While the Montagnards were depicted as disorganisers and anarchists, many Girondins presented themselves as the defenders of property and order (cf. Brissot’s A tous les républicains de France, 29 October 1792). This led many Montagnards to judge the Girondins as agents of the rich and the “bourgeois”. Robespierre, for instance, in the first issue of his Lettres à ses commettants, accuses them of only wanting to “establish a Republic for themselves … and to govern only in the interest of the rich and of the public officials.” Madame Jullien, the wife of the Montagnard deputy Jullien de la Drôme, writing in a letter to her son on 24 October 1792, judges similarly: “The Brissotins want a republic for themselves and for the rich and the others want [it to be] entirely popular and entirely for the poor, and this, along with human passions, is what scandalously divides our senate.” [16] Additionally, instead of frequenting popular societies, many prominent Girondins met in private homes or “salons” in order to discuss their policies ; the most prominent examples are the salons of Mme Roland or Valazé, but also the home of Mme Dodun, were Vergniaud received guests, or Clavière’s hôtel in Suresnes. This enforced the popular image of a “Girondin party”, and can be regarded as a proof for a certain elitism. [17] Apart from that, many Montagnards have accused the Gironde of scorning the common people, particularly the people from the Parisian faubourgs. While this is certainly not an universal view among Girondins (Concordet, for example, seems to constitute a notable exception), historians such as Jacqueline Chaumié have concluded that many of them adhered to the classical distinction between “la plèbe” (the Parisian sans-culottes from the faubourgs) and “le peuple” (the merchants, artisans and peasants from the province). Based on this, many prominent Girondins dreaded popular manifestations, as they perceived the “mob” as irrational, incontrollable and vulgar. [18] It has to be stressed that this mindset was neither exclusive to the Gironde, as many other contemporaries of the Revolution shared it, nor was it universally shared among Girondins. Nonetheless, this casts doubt on Gironde’s commitment to democracy, at least in the way it is depicted in classical historiography. It can be concluded, then, that the third and final criterion of moderateness, unwavering commitment to democracy, does not fully apply to the Gironde, either (at least not in the sense of our understanding of democracy). conclusion In summary, the policies of the Gironde do not correspond to our modern understanding of “moderateness” ; as demonstrated above, the dichotomy of the “violent, centralist and demagogic” Montagnards and the “non-violent, federalist and democratic” Girondins does not hold up to scrutiny. In general, I think that the perception of the Gironde as moderates in modern historiography is the result of a false dichotomy of “radicalism” and “moderateness”, which is in turn based on a simplistic conception of politics as a “spectrum”. To be brief: in my eyes, the Girondins were by no means “moderates” ; in their own way, they were as “radical” as the Montagnards. The struggle for hegemony in early 1793 was therefore not a conflict between “moderate” & “radical” forces, but simply between actors & “factions” (again, as elaborated above, not in the sense of modern “parties”) with fundamentally different policies.  Finally, as I mentioned earlier, I think that the perception of the Gironde as “moderate” and, generally, the dichotomy of “moderateness” and “radicalism”, as well as the negative connotation attached to the latter, are results of a massive cultural prejudice. This, in turn, is based on the central position that liberalism holds in our society and on the liberal theory of extremism. Liberalism is seen as democratic, non-violent and centred around “economic freedom”, while in reality, is has often entailed the prioritisation of privileged interests over individual freedom (and the use of violence against those who seemed to threaten these interests), as well as a certain distrust towards the “popular masses” (often expressed in elitist / classist rhetoric).   Furthermore, according to the liberal consensus, liberalism is the only position that is not “ideological” or “radical”. Consequently, the Girondins, whose policies are often in line with our modern conception of liberalism, are depicted positively, i.e. as “moderates”, whereas the Montagnards, for instance, are considered “radical” or “extremist”. This dichotomy can be found in the classical historiography of all major revolutions of the 18th and 19th century, and it is deeply embedded in our perception of history & politics. Nonetheless, as I attempted to demonstrate in this article, it has to be examined critically and re-evaluated, as it tends to distort history in order to make it fit into this narrative. Further reading: Federalism (Marcel Dorigny) The Gironde (Marcel Dorigny) Girondins et Montagnards (Albert Mathiez) Actes du colloque Girondins et Montagnards (Albert Soboul) The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution (Timothy Tackett) Finally, I want to thank @montagnarde1793, @valeria-lagrimas and @revolution-avec-revolution for their generous help and advice! What do you think, citizens? 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